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ABSTRACT
Most contemporary sociologists’ aversion towards nationalism 
contrasts with the alleged nationalist views of one of the key 
classics of sociology, Max Weber. The considerable accumulated 
scholarship on the issue presents a unified belief that Weber was 
indeed a nationalist yet varies considerably in the significance 
attributed to the issue. Most authors entrench Weber’s nationalism 
within biographical studies of Weber’s political views as an individual 
beyond Weberian sociological theorizing. A different approach 
suggests that the notions of nationality in Weber’s works do have 
certain theoretical value as potentially capable of enriching the 
current understanding of the nation. The present article aims to bring 
together the notions of nationality dispersed within Weber’s various  
writings with the Weberian methodological individualism. The main 
argument of the article is that individualism and nationalism in Weber’s 
thought are not a contradiction despite the collectivism associated 
with the essentialist view of the nation. Instead, they represent a 
reflection of the fundamental shift from an earlier view of society as 
a meganthropos towards the pluralist problematization of the micro-
macro link definitive for the modern social theory. Analyzing the 
internal logic of this change provides new insights into the currently 
debated issue of retraditionalization, especially in relation to the 
ongoing renaissance of nationalism. 
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Introduction
The current upsurge in nationalism in the public political discourse and, according to 
certain indicators, in public opinion brings to mind B. Anderson’s insightful observation 
about the contradiction in the fate of nationalism. According to Anderson, although 
we live in the world of nations and thus should recognize nationalism as the most 
successful of the competing ideologies generated in the nineteenth century, it is also 
the only ideology unrelated to an input of a major thinker of the period. It is also true 
that there is no comprehensive theory of nationalism unlike other key concepts, such 
as democracy, political culture, or even society itself, but a multitude of theoretical 
approaches dedicated to specific aspects of the issue, primarily to the origins of 
nations and nationalism. It is this emphasis on the past and, more importantly, these 
twin lacunas that might bear at least some responsibility for the present rebirth of 
nationalism remains not only unpredicted but also mostly unexplained. The quest 
for explanation poses anew Anderson’s unanswered question why there are no big 
theory and no big theorists of nationalism (Anderson, 2012). Did they underestimate 
the significance of nationalism? Or might they avoid the issue because of too acute 
personal involvement with nationalist belief pervasive in the Zeitgeist for a critical 
distance sufficient for an value-free academic scrutiny?
These considerations put a not so small and remarkably diverse body of research 
on Max Weber’s nationalism into a much wider perspective than a minor issue in a 
major classic’s biography. While any insight into life and views of a figure of Weber’s 
caliber is arguably important for its own sake, in the case of nationalism something 
more might be at stake. What matters most in this regard is the intention to separate 
Weber as one of the three founders of sociology and his theoretical legacy from the 
unsavory underpinnings of what is generally qualified as nationalist views of Weber 
as an individual. This task is especially salient considering the brand of nationalism 
prevalent in the later nineteenth – and early twentieth century Germany. On the other 
hand, if notions of nations and nationality dispersed in Weber’s writings might contain 
something more than a mere reproduction of the doxa of the period and instead offer 
certain new insight and inspirations to nations and nationalism studies. 
Against this background, this article adopts a more universalist perspective 
by daring to explore the relation of Weber’s nationalism to a key Weberian concept. 
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Moreover, the concept in question is not one from Webers’ many contributions to 
political sociology and political theory, apparently more obviously relevant to the 
nationalism issue, but the very core of Weberianism – its methodological individualism. 
Following in Anderson’s footsteps, I consider that since nation-state is a prevalent and 
prototypical form of the modern society, the study of nationalism is not merely about 
politics but about society in general – what it ultimately is and how it should be studied.
The key question this study seeks to answer is, to what extent was Weber’s 
nationalism Weberian? In other words, to what extent, if any, were Weber’s nationalist 
political inclinations merely reflective of the prevailing opinions in the society in general, 
in the academia, or in the nascent sociology – and to what extent were they relevant to 
his original contributions to social theory? The conclusion that Weberian nationalism 
does constitute a part of his theoretical legacy, and not merely a biographical detail can 
be made if at least two conditions are observed. First, Weber’s notion of nationalism 
and approach to the issue must be substantively different from those characteristics of 
his contemporaries, academics, and especially other classical sociological theorists. 
Second, this originality must provide sufficient grounds to be defined not only negatively 
as dissimilarity from others, but also positively as corresponding to at least some of the 
key concepts and principles of Weberianism. The crux of the matter is how did Weber 
address the apparent contradiction between the collectivist essence of nationalism and 
the principle of methodological individualism? Not surprisingly, this question echoes 
the contemporary tensions between individual national vs. other kinds of identities and 
between an individual’s national self-identification and the external institutional and 
normative restrictions. During the ongoing new upsurge of nationalism, unpredicted 
by social scientists, it is particularly interesting to reexamine the place of nationalism 
studies in the “big” social theory by focusing of one of its founders. 
The article is structured as follows. The first section contains a review of the 
existing scholarship on the evidence and meaning of Weber’s nationalism. The 
second section puts these findings against a broader background by comparing them 
to the period-specific notions of nations and national identities, especially among 
Weber’s fellow academics. The third section zooms in and focuses on the views on 
nationalism espoused by Weber’s three contemporaries and, in retrospect, fellow 
sociological classics – Simmel, Durkheim, and Sombart – as compared to the Weber’s 
own position. Based on the results of this comparison, the fourth section of the article 
elaborates on the implications of the identified manifestations of Weber’s nationalism 
with various degrees of originality for methodological individualism. The concluding 
section discusses the output of the study that the juxtaposition of methodological 
individualism and nationalism in Weber’s thought reflects the fundamental shift from 
an earlier view of society as a meganthropos towards the pluralist problematization of 
the micro-macro link definitive for the modern social theory.
Weber’s Nationalism: What Does It Mean and Why Should It Matter?
Most studies specifically dedicated to the essence and impact of Weber’s nationalist 
views start with the assumption that Weber indeed was a nationalist and then proceed 
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to question the meaning of this notion, implications, and scope of significance, but not 
the notion itself. The reason for this apparent consensus is that Weber’s nationalist 
views have by now not only been well documented (Mommsen, 1974) but also strongly 
advocated by such authoritative scholars as R. Dahrendorf (1992) and P. Anderson 
(1992). Momsen’s book was the first and still remains the most comprehensive 
exposure of Weber’s nationalist views expressed in various sources. When the book 
first appeared, it posed a major challenge to an image of Weber as an advocate of 
liberalism and rationality that had been created by American sociologists, most notably 
Parsons. Instead, it drew on multiple sources to portray Weber as an ardent champion 
of German imperialism and power politics in general. Since then, the image of Weber 
regarding his politics has been split and never devoid of sinister undertones. Some 
contemporary scholarship even goes so far as to claim that Weber’s nationalism was 
not only ethically unacceptable in itself, but also exercised bad influence on Naumann, 
an initially non-nationalist thinker (Kedar, 2010) and provided not entirely justified yet 
plausible source of legitimization for a much more compromised political theorist 
C. Schmitt (Engelbrekt, 2009). And yet most publications on Weber’s nationalism of the 
last decades attempt what is essentially a kind of apologetics aimed at rehabilitating 
Weber’s scholarship, liberal political views, or both. The three line of this apologetics 
run as follows.
The first and also undoubtedly quite Weberian way of limiting the significance of 
Weber’s nationalism is drawing a sharp division line between Weber as an individual 
and Weber as a scholar. Roth goes so far as to make this distinction chronological 
by claiming that Weber as a politician in the 1890s entered the public sphere as a 
politician using nationalist rhetoric for populist reasons and only later, after a personal 
crisis, reemerged as a scholar interested in pure theory as opposed to practical 
politics (Roth, 1993). Yet this view fails to account for the evidence that manifestations 
of Weber’s nationalism, let alone Weber’s political concerns and involvement, are 
dispersed throughout his writings. According to Bellamy, Weber did not abandon his 
interest in the national issue but rather modified it significantly by becoming more 
critical of nationalism, especially as Germany entered the First World war with the 
claims of which Weber rather disapproved (Bellamy, 1992). The central point of this 
line of apology is not the chronological limits, but the implied notion that nationalist 
views expressed by Weber should not be qualified as a product of his original thinking, 
unlike his theoretical heritage, which thus remains untainted, but merely reflect the 
prevailing beliefs of the society where he belonged (see also Ay, 2004). 
The second line of apology confronts this statement by regarding Weber’s 
nationalism as occupying a significant place in his views on social and political 
dynamics yet playing a secondary role as derivatives from issues of primary concern. 
Some of this scholarship advocates the need to abandon anachronistic imposition 
of the contemporary view on liberalism and nationalism as mutually exclusive and 
antagonistic ideologies onto the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany. 
Nationalism thus appears a logical, albeit not the only possible consequence, first, 
of Weber’s belief, decidedly ethnocentric by contemporary standards, in the ultimate 
value of what he saw as the Western civilization embodying the ideals of liberalism 
128 Marharyta Fabrykant
and rationalism, and second, by a social Darwinist view on the mode of promoting the 
interests of the West, which in contemporary terms amounts to the belief in the zero 
sum game. The central point of in this relation between nationalism and liberalism 
is not an essentialist belief in the spirit of the nation, but a struggle over limited and 
therefore contested economic resources, especially as Weber famously referred 
to himself as an “economic nationalist” (Kim, 2002). A different argument derives 
Weber’s nationalism not from his alleged ultra-rationalism and Machiavellianism but, 
on the contrary, from placing too much trust in the necessity and potential beneficence 
of the irrational. Thus, Pfaff portrays Weber not as a Realpolitisch technocrat, but as 
a proponent of a nationalist charismatic leadership as a path towards popular support 
of liberal democracy, lacking of the multiple illustrations from the twentieth-century of 
how this assumption may prove disastrously wrong (Pfaff, 2002). The contemporary 
relevance of technocratic geopolitics in relation to internal political liberalism and the 
use of nationalism to make democratization appealing to the majority is transparent. 
It can be argued that both these positions owe its relevance to the contrast between 
their rejection by most, even though not all, academic scholars and these notions’ 
continuing appeal to many political actors – very much as nationalism itself. Unlike in 
the first line of apologetics, this kind of reasoning places Weber’s nationalism among 
his theoretical heritage yet, unlike its major part, points its out as secondary, derivative, 
and essentially wrong. 
The third line of apology regards Weber’s views on nations and national identities 
as having an intrinsic theoretical value. Its representatives are concerned not so much 
with morality or veracity of Weber’s nationalism but with its heuristic potential for the 
contemporary understanding of nationality. Palonen regards the issue from the views 
of the history of concepts and attributes the apparent inconsistency between Weber’s 
views on nationalism by an in complete deconstruction. According to Palonen, 
Weber, especially in his post-WWI writings, demonstrates a critical self-distancing 
from nationalism understood as chauvinism, and nevertheless remains a nationalist 
in the broadest definition of the term widespread in the contemporary nations and 
nationalism studies – as a believer in the objective and necessary existence of nations 
(Palonen, 2001). Thus, Weber’s case is regarded as instrumental in broadening 
the current views on the relations between the concepts of nation and nationalism. 
Norkus, on the contrary, emphasizes the constructivist as well as essentialist views 
on the nation found in Weber’s writings and their relevance to the contemporary 
theory – first, by countering the prevalence of new nation states over old ex-empires 
in the modernist approaches to the origins of nations, and second, by applying the 
notion of rent-seeking to international relations (Norkus, 2004). In this logic, Weber’s 
nationalism is relativized largely because of its conceptual inconsistency. A decided 
nationalism would espouse a single and relatively simple definition of the nation and 
adhere to it without further theoretical alterations.
Taken together, these three views reflect a considerable variety of opinions 
in the scholarship on Weber’s nationalism and even to its historical context. 
Apparently, all the interpretations of Weber’s views on the nation, instrumentalist 
as well as genuine, objectivist as well as chauvinist, civic as well as ethnic, and 
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even constructivist as well as primordialist, can be and are in some way traced back 
to some part of the conceptual imagery in the Wilhelmine Germany. It is therefore 
necessary to transcend the information on the issue found in the relevant part of 
Weber studies and take a direct and closer look at the understanding of nations and 
national identities existing in the period.
Notions of Nations and Nationalism in Weber’s Germany
The nineteenth century is generally regarded as the age of nationalism. The “long 
nineteenth century” started with the event most theorist agree manifested the birth 
of the idea of the nation in its modern sense, the French Revolution, continued 
with Romantics’ turn to turn to “national roots” and a number of national liberation 
uprisings in various parts of Europe including the famous Spring of Nations in 1848, 
and ended with the new nation-states emerging in the centers as well as peripheries 
of the old empires and the principle of national self-determination acquiring the 
normative status in the Treaty of Versailles. According to the author of the term “long 
nineteenth century”, sometime in the middle of this period the idea of nationalism 
drastically and apparently for good changed its political belonging. The early 
nineteenth century, according to Hobsbawm, was liberal and revolutionary and was 
perceived as such by its champions and opponents alike. Later, however, as the old 
aristocratic and religious grounds of the dynastic power starting to lose credibility, 
the ruling dynasties saw nationalism as a new source of their legitimization and 
adopted it accordingly (Hobsbawm, 2012). It is mainly to this conservative turn that 
Hobsbawm mainly attributes the diffusion of the then new nationalism with the old 
interethnic hatred that surpassed the idea of the national liberation struggle “for your 
freedom and ours” and ultimately brought Europe to the WWI.
The nineteenth century Germany appears the most obvious case of this 
conservative turn. Already in 1808 in his famous “Addresses to the German nation” 
J. Fichte developed not merely an advocacy of German rather than French superiority 
but a comprehensive system of beliefs containing all the key components of what later 
became known as ethnic nationalism (Fichte, 1978). Most notably, these components 
include orientation towards the past, long history as the source of legitimacy, the value 
of authenticity understood as lack of exposure to foreign influence, and the central role 
of the national language. Later, F. Meinecke named this type of nation, where culture 
tales precedence over statehood not only in time but also in priority a Kulturnation 
with Germany as its prototypical case opposed to Staatsnation primarily represented 
with France (Meinecke, 2015). By the end of the century, the ethnic kind of nationalism 
apparently became mainstream in Germany no longer as a self-definition but as a 
general understanding of any nation (Bärenbrinker & Jakubowski, 1995). That is how this 
understanding is elaborated in the entry “Nation” of Meyers Konsersations-Lexicon, an 
authoritative encyclopedic dictionary (Meyers Konversations-Lexikon, 1888, pp. 2–3):
Nation (lat., Völkerschaft), ein nach Abstammung und Geburt, nach Sitte 
und Sprache zusammengehöriger Teil der Menschheit; Nationalität, die 
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Zugehörigkeit zu diesem. Nach heutigem deutschen Sprachgebrauch decken 
sich die Begriffe N. und Volk keineswegs, man versteht vielmehr unter “Volk” die 
unter einer gemeinsamen Regierung vereinigten Angehörigen eines bestimmten 
Staats. Wie sich aber die Bevölkerung eines solchen aus verschiedenen 
Nationalitäten zusammensetzen kann, so können auch umgekehrt aus einer 
und derselben N. verschiedene Staatswesen gebildet werden. Denn manche 
Nationen, und so namentlich die deutsche, sind kräftig genug, um für mehrere 
Staatskörper Material zu liefern. Das Wort N. bezeichnet, wie Bluntschli sagt, 
einen Kulturbegriff, das Wort “Volk” einen Staatsbegriff. Man kann also z. B. sehr 
wohl von einem österreichischen Volk, nicht aber von einer österreichischen 
N. sprechen. Zu beachten ist ferner, daß nach englischem und französischem 
Sprachgebrauch der Ausdruck N. gerade umgekehrt das Staatsvolk (die sogen. 
politische Nationalität) bezeichnet, während für die N. im deutschen Sinn des 
Wortes, für das Naturvolk (die sogen. natürliche Nationalität), die Worte Peuple 
(franz.) und People (engl.) gebräuchlich sind1. 
This extended definition reveals the self-conscious rather than naïve upholding 
of the ethnic view of the nation, the awareness of an alternative, and the word other 
than nation reserved for this alternative. Moreover, this distinction is attributed to 
the language rather than to a country-specific tradition of thought, thus implying 
the highest degree of consensus. The four criteria of a nation all constitute an 
ascribed rather than achieved identity. Later in the entry, there is no reference to 
self-determination in the sense of Renan’s everyday plebiscite (Renan, 2002). The 
subjective side of nationality is restricted to emotions such as the national feeling 
(Nationalgefühl) understood as national affinity or national pride (Nationalehre) and 
the national character (Nationalcharakter). The latter and even to some extent the 
former reflects an important point – the understanding of the nation as a personalized 
entity. It echoes the initial definition of the nation as “a part of humanity” where “a group 
of people” would seem more natural to a contemporary reader. This view of nation as 
a meganthropos was typical for the early nineteenth century German Romanticism 
(Hübner, 1991), and the cited source gives evidence of the prevalence of this view in 
the popular discourse in Weber’s formative years.
The uncritically assumed single unity of the nation is scrutinized and challenged 
by one of the most prominent philosophers of the Wilhelmine Germany, Hermann 
Cohen. According to Cohen, the nation constitutes a plurality (Mehrheit) as opposed 
1 Nation (lat. Peoplehood), a part of humanity united by shared ancestry and birth, custom and 
language; nationality, belonging to a nation. In the contemporary German usage, the notions of the nation and 
the people do not overlap; the people signify the members of a given state united under the same government. 
The population of the people can consist of multiple nationalities, and, the other way around, the multiple 
peoples may come from the same nation, because some nations, and notably Germans, are strong enough 
to lend material for many state entities. The word nation means, as Bluntschi says, a cultural concept, and 
the word the people, a state concept.  For example, it is possible to speak of the Austrian people but not the 
Austrian nation. It is further important to notice that in English and French usage, the word nation, quite on 
the contrary, refers to the people of the state (the so-called political nationality) while for the nation in the 
German sense, the natural people (the so-called natural nationality) the words people (in French) and people 
(in English) are used (translated by the author of the article).
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to unity, “allness” (Allheit). Yet, again contrary to what a contemporary reader might 
expect, Cohen does not refer to the plurality of individuals. Instead, he understands 
nation as a plurality of nationalities defined as religious entities forming a political 
union under the auspices of a shared state. A model nation for Cohen, unlike for 
the authors of the entry cited earlier, therefore was not Germany but Austria. 
Another important point is the deliberate rather than “natural” character of the union 
(Wiedebach, 2012). Thus, with the internal plurality of the nation and the constitutive 
role of self-determination, the only element missing from the present-day idea of the 
nation is its individual members.
This important omission interestingly resonates with the central principle of the 
Weberian approach to sociology – its methodological individualism, especially as it is 
closely related to the interpretative sociology (verstehende Soziologie), which Weber 
developed under the influence of Neo-Kantianism, albeit primarily its Southwestern 
school, not the Marburg school to which Cohen belonged. More generally, nationalism 
as such presupposing a certain collectivism, especially in Weber’s time as seen in 
the afore cited definition, appears distinctly at odds with methodological, as well and 
probably even more consistently so than political individualism. Yet this contradiction is 
not discussed even by L. Greenfeld who starts her programmatic book on the varieties 
of nationalism by defining herself as a Weberian precisely regarding methodological 
individualism. The next section presents an attempt of such a discussion based on 
Weber’s key texts dedicated to nations and nationalism – lecture “The Nation State 
and Economic Policy” and the part 2 of “Economy and Society”. 
National Issue in Simmel, Durkheim, and Sombart
A theoretical concept from Weber’s times that can be considered the most influential 
or at least the most frequently present in the contemporary literature on nationalism 
is George Simmel’s notion of a stranger. According to Simmel’s famous essay, the 
figure of a stranger is characteristic for modernity and thus represents yet another 
breakup from tradition – in this case, from the unequivocal overlap between spatial 
and substantive proximity (Simmel, 1999). The stranger is defined as a permanent 
other who is there to stay and nevertheless would not become more similar to the main 
body of the society he lives in no matter how long he stays. This dialectics of proximity 
and distance appears disturbing to a premodern or antimodern mind, and that it what 
sound a familiar note in the ongoing debate on migration and xenophobia, especially 
with the emphasis on the implication that the stranger is constructed as such by the 
society. Therefore, despite the logical sequence unfolding at the microlevel, the story 
centers primarily not on the stranger himself, but on the society as a whole dealing 
with the challenge of a permanent ambiguous otherness. This challenge is not 
considered as an abstract possibility, but has its obvious historical prototype in the so-
called Jewish issue, also, and somewhat similarly, addressed by Simmel with regard 
to the economic modernity (Simmel, 2004). It could be argued that at that period, the 
national issue, if not the nation itself, was conceived as modern when related to the 
Jewish issue, as seen in the works of two other Weber’s contemporaries.
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Another case of the individual vs. the nation controversy, but addressed and 
resolved in a very different way, is found in Emile Durkheim’s work dealing with the anti-
Dreyfussards (Durkheim, 1970). According to Durkheim, their view on individualism 
as posing a threat to the nation’ s unity is valid insofar as the question mark remains. 
Unlike Simmel, however, Durkheim does not see this controversy as inherent and 
dialectic. Instead, he proposes to resolve it by recognizing that the kind of individualism 
anti-Dreyfussards were attacking was essentially a straw man – not the only, not the 
proper, and not even the most popular one. While recognizing the economic egotism 
as potentially disruptive to society but also obsolete, Durkheim not only approves of a 
more “spiritual” idea of individualism but also considers its power of uniting society as 
well as any socially shared idea can and even proposes it as what can be somewhat 
anachronistically called the national idea of France. Thus, even more obviously than 
the “strangeness”, individualism is a collective attribute, a social fact.
Another way of defining the “national idea”, much more extreme and also much 
more significant in its use as a general explanatory tool, can be found in the works 
of Werner Sombart. His theoretical constructions on the alleged peculiarly Jewish 
rationalism as a driving force behind the emergence of the modern capitalism bear 
obvious resemblance to Weber’s protestant ethic, except the different relations 
between nationality and religion (Sombart, 2001). Sombart was writing his work at the 
times when the new racial theory led to redefinition of the Jewish identity from religious 
to racial – hence the “Jewish issue” could no longer be resolved by religious conversion 
and assimilation. On the contrary the assimilated yet “racially different” Jew was 
turned into an ominous figure, a disguised “stranger” among “us”, as demonstrated 
in the Dreyfus case. Later, the propaganda used by all sides during the WWI, showed 
that the racialized notion of nationality originally applied to an ethnic minority came to 
define major European nations. In a work by Sombart published in 1915 with a self-
explanatory title “Traders and Heroes”, the military clash between, respectively, the 
English and Germans was presented as a conflict between two essentially opposing 
“national characters” (Sombart, 1915). 
This essentialist idea of the national automatically extrapolated on all its members 
as micromodels was by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as seen in 
the previously quoted definitions, already anachronistic. Yet what unites this seeming 
relapse to premodern unproblematic collective identities with the challenges of 
modernity conceptualized by Simmel and Durkheim is the implication that nationality 
originally exists at the collective level and is reflected in the individuals only insofar 
as they either represent or become socialized into a collective entity. Let us now see 
whether this notion was also shared by Weber. 
Is Weber’s Nationalism Individualist?
One of Weber’s works most frequently analyzed in detail when discussing his 
nationalist views is the inaugural lecture “The Nation State and Economic Policy” 
(“Die Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik”) delivered and published in 
1895 – during the period that supposedly marks the pinnacle of Weber’s nationalism 
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2019, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 124–138 133
(Weber, 1921–1994). It is unsurprising considering that the single empirical case 
the lecture build on is the economic situation in the borderline region of the West 
Prussia framed by Weber as a struggle for power between the two nationalities – 
Germans and Poles – understood exactly in the same way the nation is defined in 
the entry on the nation cited earlier and, in relation nationality to religion, similar to 
Cohen. Moreover, Weber refers to the two nationalities as either collective entities – 
Polentum and Deutschtum (Polish and German populations respectively) – or even 
as abstract principles or uncountable substances, such as “the polish element”. 
This archaic way of description contrasts with quite modern-looking mode 
of introducing the issues unrelated to nationalism, such as social stratification and 
demographic dynamics. The question Weber asks is why the Polish nationality seems 
to him to be winning the power in the region even though “high level of economic 
sophistication (Kultur) and a relatively high standard of living are identical with the 
German people and character (Deutschtum) in West Prussia” (Weber, 1994, p. 5). 
Weber poses the question in the following way: “Yet the two nationalities have 
competed for centuries on the same soil and with essentially the same chances. What 
is it, then, that distinguishes them?” (Weber, 1994, p. 5). The suggested answer is 
this: “One is immediately tempted to believe that psychological and physical racial 
characteristics make the two nationalities differ in their ability to adapt to the varying 
economic and social conditions of existence. This is indeed the explanation and the 
proof of it is to be found in the trend made apparent by a shift in the population and its 
nationalist structure. This tendency also makes clear just how fateful that difference in 
adaptability has proved to be for the German race in the east” (Weber, 1994, p. 5). In a 
nutshell, according to Weber, the German population of the region was emigrating and 
the Polish population, multiplying despite Poles primarily belonging to a lower social 
stratum with lower living standards because Poles have lower expectations that there 
and then was able to deliver higher level of life satisfaction than Germans’ superior 
ability to improve their living standards. Weber argues that “the two races seem to 
have had this difference in adaptability from the very outset, as a fixed element in their 
make-up. It could perhaps shift again as a result of further generations of breeding of 
the kind which may have produced the difference in the first place) but at present it 
simply has to be taken account of as a fixed given for the purposes of analysis” (Weber, 
1994, p. 10).
The contradiction between the seemingly archaic and modern rhetoric 
reflects Weber’s attempt to explain a sociological phenomenon – a close relation 
between national belonging and social stratification – from the outside, by means 
of psychological rather than sociological phenomena. The understanding of 
nationalities as distinct entities with shared psychological traits belongs to the 
psychology of the peoples (Völkerpsychologie) established several decades earlier 
(the journal dedicated to advancing this field – Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und 
Sprachwissenschaft – appeared in 1859), not to the emerging sociology. It looks 
almost as if Weber struggled with the internal plurality and flexibility of society as 
captured in the notion of social stratification and has to get this new explanandum 
firmly rooted in the familiar explanans of essentialist nationalities and national 
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characters. The ultimate reasons are attributed to agency, not structure, yet this 
agency resides not in individuals but in collective entities endowed with distinct 
personalities. 
 Another Weber’s text focused on nations and nationalism is the chapter five 
of the part two of “Economy and Society” (Weber, 1922–1978). Already its title 
“Ethnic groups” suggests a different approach to the one found in “The Nation State 
and Economic Policy” because the ethnicity is no longer presented as a single 
entity but as a group of individuals. This expectation is confirmed throughout 
the text. That is how Weber defines an ethnic group: “The belief in group affinity, 
regardless of whether it has any objective foundation, can have important 
consequences especially for the formation of a political community. We shall 
call “ethnic groups” those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their 
common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or 
because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important 
for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or 
not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership (Gemeinsamkeit) 
differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group 
with concrete social action, like the latter” (Weber, 1978, p. 389). As Norkus (2004) 
justly remarked, this definition captures nearly all the key part of Anderson’s theory 
of nations as “imagined communities” – and also obviously echo the so-called 
Thomas’s theorem about objective consequences of subjective beliefs regardless 
of their initial objective grounds. What concerns the key point of this study is not 
so much the emphasis on subjectivity and the formative role of imagery in the 
emergence of an ethnic group but the shift of agency from the ethnicity to an 
individual, who provide the creative subjectivity and essentially doing the imagery. 
The question as to how the apparently uncoordinated yet similar “presumed 
identities” of multiple individuals merge into a single shared structure is given 
rather less attention. Instead, the issue of coordination between the social actors 
participating in the process of the ethnic identity construction is described from the 
individual perspective via the basic mechanisms of attraction and imitation. 
This gap in dealing with the issue of coordination gets a paradoxical solution: 
ethnic identities are positioned not as socially shared but as emerging from 
the social actions that are not widely shared. “This artificial origin of the belief 
in common ethnicity follows the previously described pattern […] of rational 
association, turning into personal relationships. If rationally regulated action is 
not widespread, almost any association, even the most rational one, creates an 
overarching communal consciousness; this takes the form of a brotherhood on 
the basis of the belief in common ethnicity” (Weber, 1978, p. 389). Unlike in “The 
Nation State and Economic Policy”, ethnicity is no longer a primary irrational cause 
for more modern and rational social phenomena, but a secondary subjective 
consequence of at least partly rational and even purely pragmatic decisions. The 
multitude of these origins capable of turning into potential subjectively ascribed 
grounds for a shared identity is so large and chaotic that Weber concludes that 
ethnicity is too much of an umbrella term to be of much academic use: “It is 
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certain that in this process the collective term ‘ethnic’ would be abandoned, for it 
is unsuitable for a really rigorous analysis. […] The concept of the ‘ethnic’ group, 
which dissolves if we define our terns exactly, corresponds in this regard to one of 
the most vexing, since emotionally charged concepts: the nation, as soon as we 
attempt a sociological definition” (Weber, 1978, p. 395).
Attempting to define the nation, Weber decisively departs with what it refers to 
as a “vague connotation” (Weber, 1978, p. 395) of various kind of common ground 
preceding the nation itself. Having considered and rejected each of these grounds, 
such as religion, language, customs and so on, Weber concludes that the concept 
“nation” directs us to political power/Hence, the concept seems to refer – if it refers at 
all to a uniform phenomenon – to a specific kind of pathos which is linked to the idea of 
a powerful political community of people who share a common language, or religion, 
or common customs, or political memories; such a state may already exist or it may be 
desired (Weber, 1978, p. 398). 
It could be argued that here again, the nation is explained by means of 
psychological phenomena – the need for emotional stimulation as captured in the 
notion of pathos, the quest for positive self-esteem, which Weber refers to as “pathetic 
pride” (Weber, 1978, p. 395), and the striving for power. Unlike the proponents of the 
view of nations as subjective and socially constructed, Weber does not attempt to tie 
the emergence of nations to a specific historical period with its specific macrolevel 
context. Instead he relies upon what he believes to be universals of human nature – 
the tendency to produce personal and emotionally charged meanings for the initially 
purely pragmatic events as long as the latter are not universally shared. Yet, unlike 
in the earlier definition, the psychological part is no longer played by static traits 
ascribed to collective agencies, but to dynamic mechanisms repeatedly occurring in 
the behavior of individuals engaged in the social action. 
Discussion
Weber’s nationalism is amenable to a number of meaningful interpretations – as a 
minor yet curious biographical idiosyncrasy, as a prompt for critical reconsideration 
of a major social scientist as a role model, as an insight into the history of concepts, 
or as a source as inspiration for the contemporary nations and nationalism studies. 
The approach presented in this article suggest yet another interpretation of Weber’s 
nationalism – as a frontier issue testing the limits and possibly also the limitations of 
Weberian sociology. 
In the introductory section of this paper, the main question whether there exists 
a Weberian view on nationality Weber’s nationalism was broken into two parts – first, 
on the originality of the ides of the nation in Weber’s writings and second, on its 
relevance to major themes in Weberianism, in particular the apparent contradiction 
with the principle of methodological individualism. Based on the present study, several 
important differences between Weber’s approach and that of his contemporaries 
become clear. First, unlike Simmel, Durkheim, and especially Sombart, in his later 
works Weber focuses not on the ways the national entity reproduces itself via 
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individuals but on the individuals developing national identities in response to their 
basic social needs. Second, unlike these three classics, Weber changed his views on 
nationality so much that while the earlier texts seem both old-fashioned and unoriginal, 
the subsequent ones, on the contrary, could have almost been written by somebody 
working not earlier than in the 1980s. 
In Weber’s earlier works, his views on nationality appear a kind of a blind spot 
borrowed from more archaic schools of thought, not sociological and due to its direct 
contradiction to the principle of methodological individualism, emphatically not 
Weberian. His mature views on nations, however, appear not only consistent with 
his approach to other social groups, but also very close to the currently mainstream 
academic understanding of nationality developed more than half a century later and 
not nationalist or even to some extent, due to its emphasis on the social construction 
of nations, anti-nationalist. To simplify the matter, it could be said that Weber’s views 
cease to be nationalist according to the contemporary understanding of nationalism 
as soon as they become Weberian. 
This analysis thus yields the main conclusion that individualism and nationalism 
in Weber’s thought are not a contradiction despite the apparent association of 
collectivism with the essentialist view of the nation. On the contrary, Weber’s work 
on integrating nationalism into his general theory of the social sphere reflects of 
the fundamental shift from an earlier view of society as a meganthropos towards 
the pluralist problematization of the micro-macro link definitive for the modern 
social theory. Analyzing the internal logic of this change provides new insights into 
the currently debated issue of the alleged retraditionalization of the late modernity, 
especially in relation to the ongoing renaissance of nationalism. It demonstrates the 
possible necessity to bring the agency back into the picture currently dominated 
with the clash between proponents of structural and cultural explanations of social 
phenomena including nations and nationalism. The transformation of Weber’s works 
on nationalism suggests that explicitly defining the agency (in general terms, not 
reduced to the images of populist politicians abusing nationalist rhetoric for their own 
rather transparent ends) is crucial for understanding and deliberately choosing the 
implied mechanisms used for explaining social dynamics.
To sum up, the question raised in this paper can be answered in the affirmative. 
Weber apparently started off burdened with nationalist views characteristic of his 
milieu and developed views on nationality that seem closer to the contemporary 
nations and nationalism studies than to his own epoch. This trajectory makes Weber 
stand out from other classics in social theory, and it is too tempting to conclude that 
in his later writings on nationality, Weber was “ahead of his own times”. Yet I would 
argue that the similarity is at best superficial in one important respect: the research 
subject outlined by Weber does not truly match the focus of the contemporary 
empirical research. We know a lot about the ways collective identities of various 
nations are constructed, quite a lot on how individuals react to the challenges 
posed by the external request for national self-identification and reenact socially 
shared meanings. We still know little on how individuals act in ways that eventually 
affect the world of nations. The main takeaway from the study on the notions on 
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nationality in Weber’s writings appear to be not theoretical, since his later views 
have already albeit much letter been reproduced, but methodological: the shift 
towards methodological individualism in the nations and nationalism studies would 
make the area much more balanced and its subject slightly more predictable to the 
contemporary social scientists.
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